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Abstract
In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommit-
ment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience
as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity
thresholds above which firms have an incentive to coordinate on higher prices. The ex-
perimental data reveals that such intra-play communication after capacity but before price
choices has a collusive effect only for capacity levels exceeding these thresholds. Subjects
with high capacities generally choose higher prices when they have the possibility to com-
municate. Asymmetry in capacity choices decreases the truthfulness of price messages as
well as the probability to coordinate on the same price.
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1 Introduction
Experimental studies of the capacity-then-price-setting game (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983)
frequently report capacity choices above the predicted levels (see, e.g., Muren, 2000; Ander-
hub et al., 2003; Le Coq and Sturluson, 2012). But even for excessive capacities subjects
might nevertheless finally choose equilibrium prices. Our aim is to identify possible implica-
tions of ‘non-excessive’ and ‘excessive’ capacities for price competition. Capacities are said
to be ‘non-excessive’ when they result in pure-strategy price equilibria and ‘excessive’ when
only mixed-strategy price equilibria exist. While non-excessive capacities and the resulting
pure-strategy price equilibria lead to identical price choices, excessive capacity choices, which
lead to mixed-strategy price equilibria, are asymmetric.
Non-binding price messages, in our setup sent after capacity but before price choices,
may allow subjects to coordinate on higher prices (see, e.g., Charness, 2000; Charness and
Grosskopf, 2004, Fonseca and Normann, 2012). While cheap talk price announcements do
not matter theoretically, their empirical effect is ambiguous. In light of the debate for more
price transparency, the effect of price announcements thus requires further investigation.
Usually price transparency is supposed to reduce information asymmetries for consumers.
However, at the same time price announcements also inform firms about their competitors’
prices. Without restrictions, e.g. regarding the frequency of possible price adjustments,
firms can easily adjust their prices in reaction to competitors’ price setting behavior.
Price transparency is targeted, e.g., by internet platforms comparing prices for the same
good across different online shops. However, price transparency may also be institutionally
implemented. In Germany, for example, a price transparency platform for gasoline stations
was introduced by the German Antitrust Agency in 2013. Since then, all stations selling more
than 1,000 m3 per year have to report price changes to the transparency platform within
five minutes.1 By making this price data openly accessible for consumers (and competitors)
the Agency hoped to intensify price competition. Critics, however, fear that the platform
will induce collusion in form of high prices (see, e.g., OECD, 2001). Earlier studies reveal
that gasoline markets are prone to collusion (see, e.g., Borenstein and Shepard, 1998). By
analyzing price adjustments following the collapse of a gasoline cartel in Québec, Clark and
Houde (2014) identify a substantial effect of collusion on gasoline prices. Thus, it remains
an open question whether price transparency does not trigger collusion instead of price
competition. In the literature collusion is often measured by how far sellers’ profits exceed
the competitive level. In our more complex setup, we simply measure ‘collusion’ by the
increase of sales prices from no communication at all to mutual price messages.
To capture the effect of price announcements on actual prices, we implement a capacity-
then-price-setting game by allowing firms to send price messages after capacity but before
price choices. This “intra-play” communication is obviously relevant in many markets. In
case of the gasoline example, firms first install capacities via their number of stations, filling
pumps, and the size of their underground fuel tanks, which can be publicly observed and
thus serve as precommitment. For given and known capacities, competitors then charge
gasoline prices. Due to the price transparency platform, firms have to report prices but can
nevertheless change them unrestrictedly and frequently. Thus, this kind of frequent price
announcements can be interpreted as non-binding price messages and, hence, as cheap talk.
Cheap talk price messages are very much debated. While Aumann (1990) conjectures that
cheap talk does not affect behavior, Farrell and Rabin (1996) suppose that it increases effi-
1§47k GWB, which became effective on March 29th, 2013, regulates the market observation for motor
fuels, where the statutory regulation, as published in Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2013 Teil I Nr. 15, defines
details such as the exact timing of price messages and who has to report them. Actual price changes have
to be reported within five minutes after taking effect.
ciency. Experimental evidence strongly supports the latter view (for a survey, see Crawford,
1998). In case of multiple equilibria Charness (2000), for example, finds that participants
coordinate on the more efficient equilibrium via cheap talk. We experimentally implement
numerical price announcements (see the related study of Harrington et al., 2016) which are
non-binding. This differs from free-format communication as studied, e.g., by Kimbrough
et al. (2008), Houser and Xiao (2011) or Moellers et al. (2002) but simplifies the analysis of
the truthfulness of messages.
Experimental evidence on communication and collusion distinguishes costly versus free
communication (see Andersson and Wengström, 2007) as well as the possibility (not) to
punish cheating (see Cooper and Kühn, 2014). Fonseca and Normann (2012) analyze the in-
terplay of communication and collusion, taking into account the impact of market structure,
and find that collusive price coordination is easier, the lower the number of firms compet-
ing in a market. Andersson and Wengström (2012)) introduce intra-play communication
additionally to pre-play communication and find that it reduces the credibility of pre-play
messages and thereby their positive effect on cooperation.
We contribute to this literature by explicitly analyzing a setting where capacity installa-
tion costs are sunk and firms are free to collude in prices. Instead of the commonly employed
pre-play communication, we implement intra-play communication only. This allows us to
analyze the effect of prior (capacity) choices on the effectiveness of communication as a trig-
ger for collusive pricing. As capacity choices in the experiment are often asymmetric, this
allows us to investigate the effect of asymmetry on communication and competition. Fur-
ther, our experimental treatments introduce the possibility of price announcements either
to subjects with prior competition experience, or to subjects without prior competition ex-
perience, i.e., we study the differential effects of communication with respect to experience.
We let participants interact repeatedly in constant pairs only for four rounds what one can
consider a worst-case scenario for observing collusion, as collusion only evolves as an equilib-
rium outcome in infinite-horizon games. Note, however, that each round involves successive
decisions, i.e., we implement repeated play of repeated games with a short horizon but mul-
tiple decisions in each round. Building on the findings of Fonseca and Normann (2012), we
consider duopoly markets, thereby providing a best-case scenario for collusion with respect
to the market’s structure.
We find that prior (asymmetric) capacity choices as well as prior competition experi-
ence play a substantial role for the effect of communication: the possibility to communicate
increases prices only if capacities are sufficiently high; asymmetry in capacities makes co-
ordinating on the same price more difficult and further reduces the truthfulness of price
messages. However, with excessive capacities asymmetry leads to higher prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the theoretical benchmark
solution of the game. Section 3 presents the experimental setup. Section 4 describes and
statistically analyzes the experimental data. Section 5 concludes.
2 The theoretical benchmark
We focus on the two-stage capacity-price game of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where we
specified the market demand function as
D(p) = α− p
with α > 0 indicating the market size. Two firms i = 1, 2 produce a homogeneous good
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at unit costs
ci =
{
0 if qi ≤ q¯i
∞ if qi > qi ,
where qi denotes production and q¯i denotes firms’ binding capacities. When rationing
occurs, the efficient rationing rule is applied, i.e., the firm-specific demand functions are
Di(pi) =
{
D(pi)− qj if pi ≥ pj
D(pi) if pi < pj ,
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage
with observable capacities q¯i, the market clearing prices
pi = p
∗ = α− q¯i − q¯j (1)
constitute an equilibrium in pure price strategies if a firm’s unilateral price deviation
above p∗ does not increase its profit p˜ii = pi(α−pi−q¯j). The resulting condition ∂p˜ii/∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=p∗
=
α− 2p∗ − q¯j = −α + 2q¯i + q¯j ≤ 0 defines the set S of non-excessive capacity pairs,
S = {(q¯1, q¯2) : q¯i ≥ 0 and α− 2q¯i − q¯j ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j}.
In Figure 1, area 1 covers this set of non-excessive capacities leading to pure-strategy
price equilibria.2
q¯1
q¯2
1
2
α/2
α/2
q¯2 ≤ q¯1
Figure 1: Areas of non-excessive and excessive capacities of firms
Equations (1) leads us to state
Hypothesis A1 With non-excessive capacities (area 1), larger capacities of firms induce
lower prices.
2Note that non-excessive capacity pairs do not only include lower but also higher capacities than predicted
by the subgame perfect equilibrium when there are positive capacity installing costs. We nevertheless denote
all capacity constellations in area 1 as ‘non-excessive’ because they are sufficiently low to exclude mixed-
strategy pricing.
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In the case of excessive capacities such that (q¯1, q¯2) /∈ S but q¯1 < α or q¯2 < α (area
2 in Figure 1), only price equilibria in mixed strategies exist. We restrict our analysis to
the case of q¯2 ≤ q¯1 ≤ α/2 in order to concentrate on only one type of mixed-strategy price
equilibria for given capacities satisfying α − 2q¯1 ≤ q¯2.3 For such capacity pairs, firms 1 and
2 randomize prices according to the cumulative distribution functions
F1(p) =
{
q¯2−(α−q¯2)2q¯2/(4q¯1p)
p−α+q¯1+q¯2
, (α−q¯2)
2
4q¯1
≤ p < α−q¯2
2
1 , p = α−q¯2
2
F2(p) =
q¯1 − (α− q¯2)2/(4p)
p− α + q¯1 + q¯2 ,
(α− q¯2)2
4q¯1
≤ p ≤ α− q¯2
2
. (2)
These distribution functions result as an extension of the symmetric solution derived
by Levitan and Shubik (1972) and as a numerical solution of the more general Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) setup. Our use of a linear market demand function allows us to specify the
lower and upper limits of the price support in terms of the capacities q¯1 and q¯2 as well as the
market size parameter α. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the price-setting subgame,
each firm charges prices according to the continuous and strictly increasing distribution
functions F1(p) and F2(p) over the coincident interval [p, p], where p ≡ (α− q2)2/(4q2) and
p = (α− q2)/2, except that firm 1 charges the uppermost price p with a positive (atomistic)
probability. Otherwise it holds that F2(p) = (q1/q2)F1(p). The distribution functions are
graphically illustrated in Figure 2.
Fi(p)
p
1
F2(p)
F1(p)
p = 36 p = 60
Figure 2: Price distributions for the parameter values α = 200, q¯1 = 100, q¯2 = 80
The effects of the excess capacities on the mixed pricing strategies can be seen from
Equations (2). An increase in q1 shifts the lower limit of the price support p to the left.
An increase in q2 shifts both the lower and the upper limit of the price support to the left.
Therefore, according to Hypothesis A1, we can state
3The complete solution for all combinations of capacities (q¯1, q¯2) leading to price equilibria in mixed
strategies can be found in the appendix.
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Hypothesis A2 With excessive capacities (area 2), larger capacities of firms (on average)
induce lower prices.
Since F2(p) ≥ F1(p) for all p ∈ [p, p], firm 1’s pricing strategy stochastically dominates
the strategy of firm 2. Because firm 1 has the bigger capacity (q¯2 < q¯1), firm 2 is more
at risk of being undersold. As a consequence, firm 1 behaves less aggressive in its mixed
price-setting strategy. This leads us to
Hypothesis B With asymmetric excessive capacities, the firms with the bigger capacities
(on average) charge lower prices.
The ratio (q1/q2) indicates the degree of asymmetry in capacities. However, more asym-
metry can be generated by an increasing capacity q1 or by a decreasing capacity q2. There-
fore, the effect of asymmetry depends on how it is caused. If it is caused by an increase in
q1, the prices decline on average. If it is caused by a decrease in q2, the prices increase on
average. This leads to
Hypothesis C More asymmetry in excessive capacities (on average) increases prices if it is
caused by an extension of the bigger capacity. It (on average) decreases prices if it is caused
by a reduction of the smaller capacity.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, firms do not install excessive
capacities. Instead, anticipating the price-setting behavior in Equation (1), in the first stage
they maximize their reduced-form profit functions
pii = (α− q¯i − q¯j − cK)q¯i, i = 1, 2; i 6= j.
with respect to their capacities, where cK denotes the constant unit cost of installing
capacities. The symmetric equilibrium capacities q¯i = q
C = (α− cK)/3, i = 1, 2, are located
on the dashed line in area 1 of Figure 1 and imply the Cournot prices
pi = p
C = (α + 2cK)/3, i = 1, 2. (3)
Our experimental parameters α = 200 and cK = 80 imply subgame perfect equilibrium
capacities qC = 40, and prices pC = 120.
In both stages of the game, firms can increase their profits by colluding. If they were
able to coordinate capacities q¯1 + q¯2 = (α − cK)/2 and charge the monopoly prices pi =
pM = (α+cK)/2, i = 1, 2, they would equally share monopoly profits. This case of perfect
collusion implies symmetric capacities q¯M = 30 and prices pM = 140.
Of course, collusion is not an equilibrium outcome of the two-stage but one-period (or
finitely repeated) game. As prior experimental results also show that collusion prevails
only in infinite horizon settings (see, e.g., Fonseca and Normann, 2012), we do not expect
perfect collusion to arise in our finite horizon experiment. However, our setting allows to
consider collusion in the second stage of price setting. If irreversible capacity decisions
are already made and installation cost are sunk, for low capacity levels (q¯1 + q¯2 < α/2)
collusive prices coincide with second-stage equilibrium prices (1). For high capacity levels
(q¯1 + q¯2 ≥ α/2) firms are better off by setting the collusive prices pi = pK = α/2, i = 1, 2.
Such collusive pricing is profit-enhancing even if production remains below the capacity
limits. The parameter values used in our experiment define the cutoff value for low capacity
levels as q¯1+ q¯2 = 100. In case of higher capacity levels collusive prices are p
K = 100. We are
interested in whether and how such collusion in prices is driven by prior capacity decisions.
According to our benchmark results, incentives to collude in prices exist only in case of high
capacity levels. Therefore we state
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Hypothesis D In case of high capacity levels, firms have an incentive to collude in prices
(only-price collusion).
Hypothesis E In case of low capacity levels, firms have no incentive to collude.
In Figure 3 the downward sloping dashed line marks the cutoff for low capacity levels,
q¯1 + q¯2 = α/2. All capacity combinations below this line (area 1a) imply that collusive and
equilibrium prices in the last stage of the game coincide. We denote these capacity combina-
tions as ‘low capacity levels.’ Capacity combinations above the dashed line (areas 1b and 2)
imply that prices are higher than equilibrium prices. We denote these capacity combinations
as ‘high capacity levels.’ Thus, all capacity pairs leading to price equilibria in mixed strate-
gies due to excessive capacities (area 2), qualify as high capacity levels for which only-price
collusion leads to higher than equilibrium prices.
q¯1
q¯2
1a
1b
2
α/2
α/2
q¯2 ≤ q¯1
Figure 3: Areas of non-excessive and excessive capacities as well as high and low capacity
levels of firms
The fact that collusion is not an equilibrium outcome continues to hold if price messages
after capacity decisions are possible. Non-binding messages are cheap talk and do not alter
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
However, in contrast to the theoretical model, experimental evidence (see, e.g., Anders-
son and Wengström, 2007; Fonseca and Normann, 2012) suggests that such communication
simplifies collusion. In combination with our results regarding capacity thresholds, the pos-
sibility of sending non-binding price messages should lead to increasing prices in case of high
capacity levels only—whereas price messages should have no effect in case of low capacity
levels as firms have no incentive to collude on higher prices in this case.
This suggests two within-subjects conditions, one with and one without price messages.
In our experiment, subjects either interacted first without and then with communication or
in reverse order, i.e., the sequence of the two within-subjects conditions was varied between
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subjects. While the former sequence captures introducing price transparency platforms,
i.e., price announcements with adjustment possibilities, the latter represents the reverse
institutional change, namely abolishing a price transparency platform.
3 Experimental design
We experimentally implement the first-capacity-then-price-setting game with two institu-
tional conditions, M and N . In condition M , after capacity choices are made and observed,
subjects simultaneously send price messages and finally set prices.4 Although we will refer to
(cheap talk) price messages as communication, we readily acknowledge that less restricted
communication may imply much stronger effects (see, e.g., Xiao and Houser (2009)). In
condition N , subjects cannot send such price messages. As anticipating behavior in later
stages is cognitively demanding, we allow participants to become experienced by playing
multiple rounds.
Our analysis of intra-play communication yields many pairs of capacity constellations but
fewer pairs of average capacity constellations by the repeatedly interacting partners. It will,
however, be illustrated below that there exists large volatility in the (average) capacity pairs
of the same partners. Thus when having to actually choose prices with or without previous
exchange of price messages the interacting parties usually confront very different decision
tasks what justifies to view their choices of announced and chosen prices rather independent
in spite of repeated interactions and rematching.
The sequence of conditions is varied between subjects leading to the two sequence treat-
ments M → N and N → M . Both treatments, M → N and N → M , are implemented
as finitely repeated games with subjects being aware of the finite number of rounds. Fol-
lowing Selten and Stoecker (1986) subjects repeat this basic game with random strangers
matching across games, based on matching groups of four subjects which remain constant
throughout one condition.5 One interacts with a new partner in three successive four-round
games in each condition. Altogether subjects played 24 rounds, three four-round games in
condition M and three four-round games in condition N .
One may view the N → M-treatment as the more typical one: firms, which have ex-
perienced probably fierce competition, may want to improve their lot by trying to coordi-
nate collusive pricing. But also the M → N -treatment has field relevance: markets with
collusive tactics, as captured by the M-condition, often attract the attention of the an-
titrust authorities which might forbid price messages, an institutional change captured by
the M → N -treatment. From the viewpoint of antitrust policy both treatments together al-
low to investigate whether tolerating sellers’ attempts to price coordination has (ir)reversible
implications: sellers, used to coordinate, will in all likelihood try to maintain former higher
prices rather than switch to competitive pricing with their previous collusion partners. Of
course, condition M of treatment N → M differs from condition M of treatment M → N .
Common findings for both M-conditions – as well as for both N-conditions – therefore render
them as rather robust.
The first experimental task is to choose a capacity level between 0 and 100. Parameter
values for capacities in the experimental design were set such that q¯1 ≤ α/2 and q¯2 ≤ α/2,
implying that capacity choices are restricted to areas 1 and 2 in Figure 1. After capacity
choices are made and revealed (and price messages were sent in the M condition) subjects
4Price messaging was exogenously enforced but sending an empty message was possible. Only 62 of 1536
price messages (4.04%) were ‘empty.’
5Matching groups, of which participants were kept uninformed, were newly formed when moving from
the first to the second condition.
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set a price between 0 and 200. Choices and outcomes are revealed to subjects after each
round.
Written instructions were read aloud at the beginning of the experiment. The instructions
for the second phase (the within-subject variation) were handed out and read aloud after
the first phase (12 rounds). In treatments N →M no hint was given that later on it will be
possible to communicate. We included control questions and trial rounds at the beginning
of each session. In all treatments starting with condition M , price messages were included
in the trial rounds as well.
Payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), converted into euros
at a given and known exchange rate (10,000 ECU = 1 euro). Besides a show-up fee of 15
euros, subjects received the payoffs of ten randomly drawn rounds (five from each of the
two conditions) as well as the reward for answering the postexperimental questionnaire on
risk tolerance (Holt and Laury, 2002).6 The experiment was programmed in z-tree (see
Fischbacher, 2007). We ran two sessions with 32 subjects for each treatment, all German
university students. On average, sessions lasted about 80 minutes and payments amounted,
on average, to 17.70 euros, ranging from 15 to 20.10 euros (including the show-up fee).
4 Experimental results
The benchmark predictions, based on the numerical parameters, predict price equilibria
with pure strategies for non-excessive capacities (area 1 in Figure 1) and mixed strategies
for excessive capacities (area 2 in Figure 1). In the experiment, 72.5% of all 1,534 capacity-
pairs lie within area 1, whereas 27.5% lie within area 2.7 Most of these capacity choices
exceed the equilibrium value of q¯ = qC = 40: 72.1% are higher, 17.9% lower, whereas
10% of all capacity choices correspond to the theoretical benchmark. Concerning capacity-
price collusion, capacity choices in the experiment exceed its predicted value of q¯ = 30
quite substantially. However, there remains the possibility of only-price collusion which
distinguishes low and high capacity levels. In the experiment, 64.7% of all capacity choices
qualify as low and 35.3% as high capacity levels. Figure 4 shows all capacity pairs chosen in
the experiment where the black line depicts the cutoff between low and high capacity levels.
Depicting mean values of the capacity choices made by all pairs across all 24 periods
reveals that the degree of asymmetry in capacity choices does not substantially vary over
time, see Figure 5. In this figure the upper solid line represents the mean values of the bigger
capacity choices across pairs whereas the lower dashed line represents the mean values of
the smaller capacity choices across pairs. Average asymmetry in capacity choices remains
substantial over time. We therefore will check for effects of asymmetry on communication
and competition in our subsequent analyses.
Hypotheses D and E predict that collusive pricing is subject to high capacity levels, i.e.,
we should see significantly different price choices for high versus low capacity levels. Table 1
displays mean price choices distinguishing between low and high capacity levels. A Wilcoxon
matched-pair signed rank (WSR) test finds that mean prices for low versus high capacity
levels significantly differ (p < 0.0001).
6Pilot sessions showed that some participants accumulated substantial losses which they could either pay
out-of-pocket or work off by clerical work post-experimentally (counting the frequency of the letter “t” in a
given text).
7Altogether the experiment gave us 24 · 64 = 1,536 capacity pairs. However, due to choices of zero
capacities, we dropped 2 capacity pairs from the data.
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Figure 4: Capacity choices
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Figure 5: Capacity choices over time
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Figure 6: Price choices and messages over time
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Price i Price j
Price message i Price message j
Treatment N →M M → N
Low capacity levels 114.35 112.64
(1.10) (1.09)
High capacity levels 92.72 94.38
(0.49) (0.54)
Table 1: Mean values (standard errors) of price choices for high (low) capacity levels
Price choices further vary across conditions M and N, treatments M→N and N→M, and
over time, see Figure 6. This figure depicts mean values of paired price choices, i.e., the
mean of the higher prices across all pairs (upper black solid line) as opposed to the mean of
the lower prices across all pairs (lower grey solid line). The dashed lines in Figure 6 display
the corresponding price messages. Comparing the higher and lower prices across treatments
we find that they are significantly different from each other (Mann Whitney test (MW),
p < 0.0001 for the higher, p < 0.01 for the lower prices). This finding highlights that it
is crucial whether subjects experience price competition before they have the possibility to
communicate, or not. Thus, ‘competition experience’ is a factor we need to take into account
in our subsequent analyses.
Concerning price messages Figure 6 illustrates that announced prices are generally un-
truthful. In fact, testing the statistical difference between the distribution of announced and
chosen prices confirms this (WSR test, p < 0.0001). The possibility to communicate never-
theless has a substantial effect on price choices: in treatment N →M mean prices move from
96.9 without communication to 102.35 with communication, whereas in treatment M → N
mean prices with communication amount to 103.36 and decrease to 99.55 without communi-
cation. In both cases, the difference in prices with and without communication is statistically
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significant (WSR test, p < 0.0001).
Hypotheses A1 and A2 predict that prices decrease in capacities. We thus test how own
capacity choice, q¯own, and the capacity choice of the other, q¯other, affect price choices. To
control for possible endgame effects, we include a dummy for the final round of repeated
interaction with the same partner, fRound (round 4 of 4). We further control for experience
by including the number of games a subject has played in total (varying from 1 to 6). In this
and all subsequent estimations standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Estimation
results are reported in Table 2.
Overall N → M M → N
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own -0.447
∗∗∗ (0.025) -0.462∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.433∗∗∗ (0.037)
q¯other -0.229
∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.274∗∗∗ (0.032) -0.185∗∗∗ (0.034)
fRound -2.224∗∗∗ (0.732) -2.525∗∗∗ (0.965) -1.858∗ (1.114)
Game 0.289 (0.269) 0.572 (0.374) 0.036 (0.384)
Constant 136.932∗∗∗ (2.470) 142.853∗∗∗ (3.845) 135.019∗∗∗ (3.791)
Observations 3068 1534 1534
R2 0.238 0.285 0.201
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at pair level
Table 2: Effect of capacities on price choices
Table 2 displays a significantly negative effect for both capacity choices as well as for
fRound for the collapsed data as well as for both treatments separately. These estimation
results corroborate the negative relationship proposed by Hypotheses A1 and A2 and confirm
the relationship suggested by the descriptive evidence. As both capacities are mutually
revealed before subjects set their prices, the negative relation does not only hold for the own
but also for the other’s capacity, although the sensitivity to the own capacity is about twice
as large. We state
Result A Higher own as well as other’s capacities lead to lower prices.
Hypotheses B and C predict that asymmetry in capacity choices affects prices only for
excessive capacities: while the subject with the bigger capacity within a pair is expected
to chose the lower price, the degree of asymmetry is expected to either decrease or in-
crease prices. To capture asymmetry we calculate the relative difference in capacity choices,
q¯asym, as the absolute difference between a pair’s capacities weighted by the higher capac-
ity. Whether a subject has the bigger capacity within a pair is reflected by the dummy
variable q¯big. We test how asymmetry affects price choices controlling for the sum of capaci-
ties (q¯sum), the possibility to communicate (M), endgame effects (fRound), and experience
(game). Table 3 reports estimation results for competition experienced subjects (treatment
N →M).
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Non-excessive capacities Excessive capacities
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯sum -0.584
∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.052 (0.035)
q¯big -6.309
∗∗∗ (0.923) -3.222∗∗ (1.246)
q¯asym 3.100 (2.664) 7.979
∗ (4.719)
M 1.099 (0.996) 3.836∗∗∗ (1.410)
fRound -1.433 (0.911) -4.970∗∗∗ (1.138)
Game 0.745∗∗ (0.312) -0.675∗ (0.406)
Constant 158.624∗∗∗ (3.946) 97.669∗∗∗ (5.906)
Observations 2224 844
R2 0.27 0.053
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 3: Effect of asymmetry on price choices
We find that for non-excessive capacities the overall sum of capacities (q¯sum) and the
dummy indicating whether a subject chose the bigger capacity (q¯big) have a significantly
negative effect on prices, whereas experience (game) leads to significantly higher prices. For
excessive capacities the dummy indicating whether a subject chose the bigger capacity (q¯big),
experience (game), and endgame effects (fRound) negatively affect prices, whereas a higher
degree of asymmetry (q¯asym) and communication (M) lead to significantly higher prices.
Hypotheses B and C predict effects of asymmetry only in case of excessive capacities. Our
results reveal that–due to the high number of asymmetric capacity choices in the experiment–
having the bigger capacity within a pair leads subjects to chose a lower price, irrespectively of
whether capacities are excessive or not. Subjects’ individual choices thus differ significantly
with respect to the asymmetry within a pair. We state
Result B Asymmetry in capacities within a pair leads the subject with the bigger capacity
to choose a lower price.
The overall degree of asymmetry affects prices only in case of excessive capacities, as
predicted. Following Hypothesis C this suggests that asymmetry is caused by a ceteris
paribus increase of the bigger capacity within a pair. We state
Result C Asymmetry in capacities overall increases prices in case of excessive capacity
levels.
Hypotheses D and E predict price collusion in case of high, but no effect in case of
low capacity levels. In a first step we compare prices without non-binding price messages
(condition N) with the prices predicted by the benchmark. In case of low capacity levels
there is no incentive to collude and the prediction is that subjects choose the equilibrium
price according to Equation (1). In case of high capacity levels subjects have an incentive to
collude and the predicted collusive price is pK = 100. As results differ across treatments (see
Table 1), we report them for competition experienced and unexperienced subjects separately.
In case of competition experienced subjects the average price for high capacity levels
is 90.79 in condition N and 94.92 in condition M , whereas the collusive price is 100. Chosen
and collusive prices differ significantly (WSR test, p < 0.0001). For low capacity levels the
average price in condition N is 113.10 whereas the average equilibrium price is 122.14.8 Cal-
culating optimal prices for every capacity pair finds that distributions of chosen and optimal
8We derive this number by calculating the optimal price for every capacity pair by inserting capacity
choices into Equation (1) and then computing the mean of these collusive prices.
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prices significantly differ (WSR test, p < 0.0001). Average prices in condition M amount to
115.32 whereas the average equilibrium price is 119.24. Calculating equilibrium prices for
every capacity pair in condition M finds the distributions of chosen and equilibrium prices
significantly different from each other (WSR-test, p < 0.0001). Although we observe too
low prices with respect to the benchmark predictions for all capacity levels, the difference
between average chosen and collusive/equilibrium prices is smaller in condition M as com-
pared to condition N . Thus, communication may serve as an instrument to increase prices
in case of competition experienced subjects.
Conducting the same exercise when non-binding price messages are introduced to subjects
without prior competition experience (M → N) reveals a somewhat different picture.
For low capacity levels the average price of 115.56 in condition N is significantly different
from the average equilibrium price calculated as 121.29 (WSR-test p < 0.0001). In condition
M the average price is 108.68 and differs significantly from the average equilibrium price of
120.29 (WSR-test p < 0.0001). There is also no effect in case of high capacity levels: average
chosen prices in condition N are 93.51 and 95.10 in conditionM and both differ significantly
from the collusive price 100 (WSR-test, p < 0.0001).
In the benchmark the term “collusion” does not only describe a situation where prices
increase above the competitive level, but additionally implicates that firms coordinate on
the same price. In the experimental data only 13.7% of chosen price pairs are identical,
i.e., collusion in the sense of price coordination is rather rare. Nevertheless, to identify
the role of communication for price coordination, we estimate a probit model with dummy
variable same as dependent variable taking unit value whenever chosen prices are identical.
We estimate the effect of communication as well as of the asymmetry of capacity choices
(q¯asym) on same controlling for whether the sum of capacities within a pair qualifies as high
(CapSumHigh), endgame effects (fRound) and experience (game). Estimation results are
reported in Table 4.
treatment M → N treatment N → M
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own -0.003 (0.003) -0.009
∗∗ (0.004)
q¯other -0.003 (0.003) -0.009
∗∗ (0.004)
CapSumHigh 0.246∗ (0.141) 0.353 (0.236)
M -0.093 (0.168) 0.770∗∗ (0.315)
q¯asym -0.777
∗∗∗ (0.202) -1.821∗∗∗ (0.341)
fRound 0.100 (0.093) 0.045 (0.117)
Game 0.005 (0.053) -0.160 (0.098)
Constant -0.809∗∗ (0.317) 0.188 (0.400)
Observations 1534 1534
Log-likelihood -517.39 -534.375
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 4: Effect of communication and asymmetry on price coordination
In both treatments the asymmetry of capacity choices decreases the probability that
subjects manage to coordinate on the same price. For competition experienced subjects
communication increases the probability that a pair coordinates price choices. For subjects
without competition experience the probability of coordinating on the same price is higher
when the sum of capacities is high. Own and other’s capacity have a very small significantly
negative effect only for competition experienced subjects.
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Given that “true” collusion–in the sense that subjects coordinate on the same higher
than competitive price–is rare, we next investigate whether subjects attempt to increase
prices (if not to the collusive level) if capacity levels are high. Descriptive evidence reported
earlier suggests that competition experienced subjects use the possibility to communicate
to increase prices. Our next step is to investigate this finding by estimating the effect of
communication (M), asymmetry (q¯big), and experience (game) on price choices. Asymmetry
is hereby captured by the dummy q¯big indicating whether, out of a pair, a subject has the
bigger capacity because this allows us to test whether there is a specific effect of communica-
tion in combination with asymmetry by including an interaction term between both dummy
variables (q¯big
∗M). Further, we control for possible endgame effects (fRound) as well as for
competition experience (compExp) and experience in playing the game. Table 5 reports
estimation results.
low capacity levels high capacity levels
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own -1.056
∗∗∗ (0.095) -0.182∗∗∗ (0.031)
q¯other -0.385
∗∗∗ (0.095) -0.125∗∗∗ (0.030)
q¯big 3.054 (2.697) -1.762 (1.284)
M -0.759 (2.261) 3.310∗∗∗ (1.128)
q¯∗bigM -0.215 (2.860) -0.544 (1.455)
CompExp 2.156 (1.515) -1.417 (0.914)
fRound -1.450 (1.708) -2.664∗∗∗ (0.685)
Game 1.829∗∗∗ (0.430) -0.178 (0.275)
Constant 161.992∗∗∗ (6.881) 113.902∗∗∗ (2.679)
Observations 1084 1984
R2 0.238 0.078
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 5: Effect of communication on price choices
Estimation results support and extend our descriptive findings: if capacity levels are
high, communication significantly increases price choices, irrespectively of the competition
experience subjects have. Further, besides the negative effect of own and other’s capacities
on prices we find that experience in playing the game increases prices for low capacity levels,
whereas endgame effects decrease prices for high capacity levels. We state
Result D Communication leads to higher prices if capacity levels are high.
Estimation results for low capacity levels (see Table 5, column I) support Hypothesis E
proposing that communication does not increase prices for low capacity levels.
Result E Communication has no effect if capacity levels are low.
This substantial role of communication is somewhat surprising if one recalls the difference
between average announced as opposed to chosen prices visible in Figure 6. To investigate
what affects the ‘truthfulness’ of communication we exploit the simplicity of the implemented
numerical form of messages and calculate the difference between announced and chosen
price as an indicator for truthfulness. The lower this difference is, the more truthful is a
message. We estimate the effect of capacity choices (q¯own, q¯other), whether the cutoff for high
capacities is met (CapSumHigh), and asymmetry (q¯asym) on truthfulness controlling for
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competition experience (compExp), experience in playing the game (game), and endgame
effects (fRound). Estimation results are reported in Table 6.
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own 0.295
∗∗∗ (0.066)
q¯other 0.291
∗∗∗ (0.064)
CapSumHigh -3.437 (2.931)
CompExp -15.219∗∗∗ (5.050)
q¯asym 15.028
∗∗∗ (4.348)
fRound 3.505∗∗ (1.383)
Game 1.500 (1.499)
Constant -6.192 (6.691)
Observations 1474
R2 0.115
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 6: Truthfulness of price messages
While higher own and other’s capacity, asymmetry of capacity choices as well as endgame
effects decrease the truthfulness of price messages, competition experience substantially in-
creases the truthfulness of messages. Thus, if subjects are familiar with the basic market
mechanisms, they communicate prices more truthfully.
Given the crucial role of high versus low capacity levels for price choices, the question
arises whether subjects’ capacity decisions are driven by their individual risk attitudes. To
test this we use the risk attitudes derived from the post-experimental questionnaire. The
variable RISK thereby reflects a subject’s individual risk aversion: as RISK increases, risk
aversion increases. We test whether capacity choices are affected by risk aversion control-
ling for the effects of communication (M), competition experience (compExp), experience
(game), and endgame effects (fRound). Estimation results are reported in Table 7.
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.)
RISK -0.930∗∗ (0.377)
M 1.271 (1.215)
CompExp 0.970 (1.211)
fRound -1.075 (0.735)
Game -1.784∗∗∗ (0.367)
Constant 65.645∗∗∗ (2.837)
Observations 2781
R2 0.029
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 7: Effect of risk attitude on capacity choices
Risk aversion as well as experience significantly reduce the individually chosen capacity.
However, the incentive to set higher prices is not driven by individual, but by the sum of
a pair’s capacity choices. Therefore, we next estimate the effect of risk aversion on the
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probability that the cutoff for high capacities is met. For this we calculate the average
risk aversion (RISKavg) for every pair and estimate a probit model where the probability
that the cutoff for high capacities is met is explained by average risk aversion (RISKavg)
and communication (M) controlling for competition experience (compExp), experience in
playing the (game) and endgame effects (fRound).
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.)
RISKavg -0.035 (0.027)
M 0.024 (0.083)
CompExp 0.175∗∗ (0.083)
fRound -0.024 (0.057)
Game -0.099∗∗∗ (0.025)
Constant 0.844∗∗∗ (0.209)
Observations 2781
Log-likelihood -1774.142
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level
Table 8: Effect of risk attitude on the probability that the cutoff for high capacities is met
Competition experience positively affects the probability that the sum of capacities is
high whereas experience in playing the repeated game has a negative effect. Average risk
aversion shows no significant effect. Thus, while individual risk aversion does significantly
affect individual capacity choices, the effect is not strong enough to carry over to the sum of
a pair’s capacity choices.
5 Concluding remarks
Most experimental studies of cheap-talk communication implement more or less liberal co-
ordination devices before participants decide. In our experimental investigation with price
messages, participants first choose capacity levels, and can then exchange only numerical
price messages before finally choosing the actual sales prices (intra-play communication). In
spite of the collusion-unfriendly rather short finite time horizon of interacting with the same
partner, communication has a differential effect which is mainly driven by prior capacity
choices and competition experience. In a nutshell, communication leads to higher prices
if the cutoff for high capacities is met or if subjects are competition experienced. Asym-
metry in capacity choices also increases prices if capacities are excessive, but reduces price
coordination as well as the reliability of price messages.
By varying within subjects the order of conditions with and without price messages, we
experimentally analyzed the institutional change of introducing, respectively abolishing price
messages. As often, such an institutional change is not reversible: after fierce competition
without price messages, participants increase prices for all capacity levels when allowed to
communicate. The finding that introducing price messages after a phase of competition
triggers higher prices even for low capacities, is a warning against such institutional reforms
which include the implementation of a price transparency platform allowing for frequent price
changes (as for Germany for fuel prices announced by gas stations). Although customers may
welcome more price transparency, its “dark side” is its possible collusive effect, especially for
high capacity levels.
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From an industrial economics perspective our study illustrates that the innovative idea of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to justify quantity competition à la Cournot via first capacity
then price competition allows for new and hopefully informative studies of communication
differing from usual “pre-play communication” in theoretical and experimental explorations.
Our results illustrate that “intra-play communication” can yield new and interesting in-
sights. So far the literature only introduces intra-play communication additionally to pre-
play communication what reduces the credibility of pre-play messages. Our results add to
these findings of intra-play communication that its differential effects depend on subjects’
experience as well as on their past decisions: due to past choices firms may face asymmet-
ric incentives when deciding what to communicate. The degree of asymmetry drives the
truthfulness of communicated messages and decreases the probability of successful price co-
ordination. Decision experience as well as choices made before announcing pricing intentions
thus significantly influence the effects of communication on competition.
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Appendix
A. The complete solution of price equilibria in mixed strategies, depending on
excessive capacities
Depending on the capacity precommitments, we have to distinguish three cases. First, if
(α− q¯2)2 ≤ 4q¯1(α− q¯1) and 2q¯1 − α ≤ q¯2, firms randomize according to the distributions
F1(p) =
{
q¯2−(α−q¯2)2q¯2/(4q¯1p)
p−α+q¯1+q¯2
, (α−q¯2)
2
4q¯1
≤ p < α−q¯2
2
1 , p = α−q¯2
2
F2(p) =
q¯1 − (α− q¯2)2/(4p)
p− α + q¯1 + q¯2 ,
(α− q¯2)2
4q¯1
≤ p ≤ α− q¯2
2
.
Second, if (α− q¯2)2 ≤ 4q¯1(α− q¯1) and q¯2 ≤ 2q¯1 − α, firms randomize according to
F1(p) =


q¯2−(α−q¯2)2 q¯2/(4q¯1p)
p−α+q¯1+q¯2
, (α−q¯2)
2
4q¯1
≤ p ≤ α− q¯1
4q¯1p−(α−q¯2)2
4q¯1p
, α− q¯1 ≤ p < α−q¯22
1 , p = α−q¯2
2
F2(p) =


q¯1−(α−q¯2)2/(4p)
p−α+q¯1+q¯2
, (α−q¯2)
2
4q¯1
≤ p ≤ α− q¯1
α−p−(α−q¯2)2/(4p)
q¯2
, α− q¯1 ≤ p ≤ α−q¯22
.
Finally, if 4q¯1(α− q¯1) ≤ (α− q¯2)2, firms randomize according to
F1(p) =


2p−α+
√
2q¯2−q¯22
2p
,
α−
√
2q¯2−q¯22
2
≤ p < α−q¯2
2
1 , p = α−q¯2
2
F2(p) =
α− p− (α− q¯2)2/(4p)
q¯2
,
α−
√
2q¯2 − q¯22
2
≤ p ≤ α− q¯2
2
.
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B. Instructions
General information
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn off your
mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are identical for
each participant. During the experiment it is forbidden to talk to other participants. In case
you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment as well as
from any payment.
You will receive 15 euros for participating in this experiment. The participation fee and
any additional amount of money you will earn during the experiment will be paid out to
you privately in cash at the end of the session. No other participant will know how much
you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be given in ECU (experimental
currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be converted into Euro using the following
exchange rate:
10.000 ECU = 1 euro
Procedure of the experiment
The experiment consists of 2 parts with 12 rounds each. In each part you will make
decisions at three stages. One stage consists of four rounds. You receive the instructions for
the second part after finishing the 12 rounds of part 1.
At the end of the experiment, 5 rounds of each part will be randomly selected to determine
your payment. You will receive the sum of your payoffs you have earned in 10 rounds. Your
total payment will be composed of the participation fee of 15 Euro and the amounts you
earned in the 10 randomly selected rounds.
If you suffer a loss in the 10 selected rounds, you can pay it in cash or balance it by
completing additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that these additional
tasks can only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to increase your earnings.
Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from the questionnaire part. Hence,
you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part in any case.
Introduction
In this experiment you take the role of a manager in a company. You decide how many
units of a good your company should produce. This amount specifies the capacity of your
company. Afterwards, you choose the selling price for the produced good. Your company
has a competing company which produces the same good. You compete against the other
company in four rounds. Afterwards, another competitor will be randomly assigned to you.
You will not be informed about the other manager’s identity.
In each round of the experiment, you will first make decisions about the capacity, followed
by decisions about the price. At the beginning of each round, you and the company you are
competing with will decide about your capacity simultaneously and independently of each
other. The capacity corresponds to the amount of goods that your company is planning
to produce in this round. Every capacity unit costs a fixed amount. After your capacity
decision, you will be informed about the capacity decision of your competing company. Af-
terwards, both companies choose their selling price for their good at the same time. The
company with the lower price gets the chance to sell its produced amount first. The company
20
with the higher price can sell something only if the preferred company has produced too little
to sell something to every interested costumer. If the prices are equal, the customers are
distributed to both companies equally (if the number of customers is odd, it will be rounded
to the next higher even number). In any case, both companies have to pay their production
costs. This holds even if they have not sold anything.
Definition of the experiment - Part 1
The experiment consists of 2 parts which are divided in 3 stages. At the beginning of
each stage, the groups of two companies are assigned by chance and anew.
One stage consists of four rounds in which you interact with the same competing company.
The procedure is as follows:
1. Both companies choose a capacity between 0 and 100 at the same time. The costs are
80 ECU for each capacity unit.
2. The capacity decisions are announced.
3. Both companies choose a price between 0 and 200 for the produced good at the same
time.
4. The chosen prices are announced, the produced goods are sold and both companies
come to know their earnings or losses and the ones of the other company.
The demand of your produced good complies with your chosen price: The more expensive
the good, the less it is bought.
The number of customers for the produced good is computed by the software and depends
on price p. It equals the amount 200-p. This means that the number of customers declines
with a rising price.
Your payment is composed of your revenues minus your production costs. For every sold
good you receive the chosen price and pay production costs for every produced unit. The
amount you sell depends on whether your price is lower, higher or equal to the price of the
other company in your group:
a) Your price is lower.
In this case you first get the chance to sell your produced amount. For every unit sold
you receive your price p. If an amount M is requested, you earn p*M. From this you have
to subtract the production costs of 80 ECU per produced unit. If the requested amount M
exceeds your capacity, the other company can sell something at its higher price. This will
work if interested customers remain that are ready to pay the higher price.
b) Your price is higher.
In this case you only sell something if the other company has produced too little. If there
are remaining customers who are ready to buy at the higher price, they will buy from you.
For every unit sold you receive the chosen price. Even if you sell nothing or less than you
have produced you have to pay all the production costs at the amount of 80*your capacity.
c) Both prices are equal.
In this case both companies can each sell to one half of the customers. Even if you sell less
than you have produced you have to pay all the production costs.
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Therefore, your payment can be summarized as follows:
Your price*sold amount - 80*your capacity
Please note that the production costs of 80*your capacity also arise even if you sell
nothing or less than you produced in one round.
You will receive instructions for part 2 at the end of stage 1.
Before part 1 of the experiment begins, we ask you to answer a few control questions to
help you understand the rules of the experiment. This is followed by one practice round,
so that you can become familiar with the structure of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
Instructions for part 2
Part 2 also consists of three stages. At the beginning of each stage the groups of two
companies are chosen randomly.
Afterwards, there will be 4 rounds in each stage. The process of these rounds only differs
from the rounds in part 1 insofar that the companies can tell the other company the price
they will determine before choosing a price. This statement is not binding, e.g., the actual
decision can be different from the price which was told.
If you have any questions about part 2, please raise your hand.
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